ENTERASYS-RADIUS-AUTH-CLIENT-ENCRYPT-MIB

INTEGER (1..2147483647) · Integer32

A number uniquely identifying each conceptual row in the etsysRadiusAuthServerEncryptTable. In the event of an agent restart, the same value of etsysRadiusAuthServerIndexEncrypt must be used to identify each conceptual row in etsysRadiusAuthServerTableEncrypt as prior to the restart.

RadiusEncryptedStringBefore encryption, the 'native' objects must be encoded into a formatted Octet String. After decryption, the Octet String must be decoded to obtain the 'native' objects. Fields which contain integers must be in network byte order prior to encryption of the formatted octet string. The network byte order for the Internet protocol suite is big endian. The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) functions htons and htonl will convert two and four byte integers, respectively, from host to network byte order. Likewise, the BSD functions ntohs and ntohl will convert integers from network byte order to host byte order. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Salt | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | String ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type The data type of the non-encrypted 'native' data: 1 = Integer32 2 = OCTET STRING Length The length in octets of the native object sub-field of the Octet String, exclusive of any optional padding. Note that the Integrity Check sub-fields (CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address) are not included in this length value, but since the IC sub-fields are always present and are of fixed length, there is no impediment to proper packet parsing. Salt The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each object. The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field MUST be set (1). The contents of each Salt field in a given SNMP packet must be unique. This two-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). String 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CRC (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OID-tail (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Time Stamp (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source IPv4 address (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Object/Padding ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The plain-text String field consists of six logical sub-fields: the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields (all of which are required), and the optional Padding sub-field. The String field MUST be treated as a counted-string of undistinguished octets, and not as a standard C/UNIX-style null-terminated, printable ASCII string. CRC Sub-field The CRC sub-field contains a 32-bit CRC (CRC-32) calculated over the following concatenated sub-fields of the String: the OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and unpadded native Object fields. The CRC sub-field acts as an integrity check on the decrypted data. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). OID-tail Sub-field The OID-tail sub-field contains the least significant four octets of the Object ID of the varbind. This field is included as an integrity check on the OID of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Time Stamp Sub-field The Time Stamp sub-field contains a 32-bit unsigned integer value representing the time the encrypted message was assembled. This field acts as an integrity check by facilitating the disposal of stale or replayed messages. The time window of acceptance is implementation dependent, and may be the subject of local (i.e. managed entity) policy configuration. The Time Stamp is relative time, in units of seconds, referenced to the sysUpTime object of the managed entity. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Source IPv4 address Sub-field The Source IPv4 address sub-field contains an unsigned 32-bit representation of the IPv4 address of the source of the encrypted message. This is an added check to allow verification of the source of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). The CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, and Source IPv4 address sub-fields are collectively hereinafter referred to as the Integrity Check (IC) sub-fields. Object/Padding Sub-field Object The Object sub-field contains the actual or native object data followed by padding, if necessary. If the 'native' data type is Integer32, this field must be in network byte order (big endian). Padding If the combined length (in octets) of the non-encrypted CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address, and native Object sub-fields is not an even multiple of 16, then the Padding sub-field MUST be present. If it is present, the length of the Padding sub-field is variable, between 1 and 15 octets. The value of the pad octets MUST be zero. Encrypting/Decrypting the String Field The entire String field MUST be encrypted as follows, prior to transmission: Construct a plain-text version of the String field by concatenating the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields. If necessary, pad the resulting string until its length (in octets) is an even multiple of 16. It is required that zero octets (0x00) be used for padding. Call this plain-text P. Shared Secret The shared secret is formed from the MAC (hardware) address of the primary management interface of the managed device (containing the RADIUS Client). The MAC address is represented as upper-cased, dashed-ASCII string, e.g. 08-00-2B-11-22-33. This string is not null-terminated. Authenticator The 128-bit authenticator is a manageable object. This field is a 16 byte (not null-terminated) ascii string. The pre-defined factory default value is an Enterasys Networks trade secret. The user is advised to change it from the default value after initial configuration of the system. Call the shared secret S, the [pseudo-random] 128-bit Authenticator R, and the contents of the Salt field A. Break P into 16 octet chunks p(1), p(2)...p(i), where i = len(P)/16. Call the cipher-text blocks c(1), c(2)...c(i) and the final cipher-text C. Intermediate values b(1), b(2)...c(i) are required. Encryption performed in the following manner ('+' indicates concatenation): b(1) = MD5(S + R + A) c(1) = p(1) xor b(1) C = c(1) b(2) = MD5(S + c(1)) c(2) = p(2) xor b(2) C = C + c(2) . . . . . . b(i) = MD5(S + c(i-1)) c(i) = p(i) xor b(i) C = C + c(i) The resulting encrypted String field will contain c(1)+c(2)+...+c(i). SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING

The dotted-decimal IPv4 address of RADIUS authentication server. This parameter value is maintained across system reboots. This object's true data type is 2, OCTET STRING.

RadiusEncryptedStringBefore encryption, the 'native' objects must be encoded into a formatted Octet String. After decryption, the Octet String must be decoded to obtain the 'native' objects. Fields which contain integers must be in network byte order prior to encryption of the formatted octet string. The network byte order for the Internet protocol suite is big endian. The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) functions htons and htonl will convert two and four byte integers, respectively, from host to network byte order. Likewise, the BSD functions ntohs and ntohl will convert integers from network byte order to host byte order. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Salt | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | String ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type The data type of the non-encrypted 'native' data: 1 = Integer32 2 = OCTET STRING Length The length in octets of the native object sub-field of the Octet String, exclusive of any optional padding. Note that the Integrity Check sub-fields (CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address) are not included in this length value, but since the IC sub-fields are always present and are of fixed length, there is no impediment to proper packet parsing. Salt The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each object. The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field MUST be set (1). The contents of each Salt field in a given SNMP packet must be unique. This two-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). String 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CRC (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OID-tail (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Time Stamp (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source IPv4 address (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Object/Padding ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The plain-text String field consists of six logical sub-fields: the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields (all of which are required), and the optional Padding sub-field. The String field MUST be treated as a counted-string of undistinguished octets, and not as a standard C/UNIX-style null-terminated, printable ASCII string. CRC Sub-field The CRC sub-field contains a 32-bit CRC (CRC-32) calculated over the following concatenated sub-fields of the String: the OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and unpadded native Object fields. The CRC sub-field acts as an integrity check on the decrypted data. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). OID-tail Sub-field The OID-tail sub-field contains the least significant four octets of the Object ID of the varbind. This field is included as an integrity check on the OID of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Time Stamp Sub-field The Time Stamp sub-field contains a 32-bit unsigned integer value representing the time the encrypted message was assembled. This field acts as an integrity check by facilitating the disposal of stale or replayed messages. The time window of acceptance is implementation dependent, and may be the subject of local (i.e. managed entity) policy configuration. The Time Stamp is relative time, in units of seconds, referenced to the sysUpTime object of the managed entity. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Source IPv4 address Sub-field The Source IPv4 address sub-field contains an unsigned 32-bit representation of the IPv4 address of the source of the encrypted message. This is an added check to allow verification of the source of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). The CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, and Source IPv4 address sub-fields are collectively hereinafter referred to as the Integrity Check (IC) sub-fields. Object/Padding Sub-field Object The Object sub-field contains the actual or native object data followed by padding, if necessary. If the 'native' data type is Integer32, this field must be in network byte order (big endian). Padding If the combined length (in octets) of the non-encrypted CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address, and native Object sub-fields is not an even multiple of 16, then the Padding sub-field MUST be present. If it is present, the length of the Padding sub-field is variable, between 1 and 15 octets. The value of the pad octets MUST be zero. Encrypting/Decrypting the String Field The entire String field MUST be encrypted as follows, prior to transmission: Construct a plain-text version of the String field by concatenating the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields. If necessary, pad the resulting string until its length (in octets) is an even multiple of 16. It is required that zero octets (0x00) be used for padding. Call this plain-text P. Shared Secret The shared secret is formed from the MAC (hardware) address of the primary management interface of the managed device (containing the RADIUS Client). The MAC address is represented as upper-cased, dashed-ASCII string, e.g. 08-00-2B-11-22-33. This string is not null-terminated. Authenticator The 128-bit authenticator is a manageable object. This field is a 16 byte (not null-terminated) ascii string. The pre-defined factory default value is an Enterasys Networks trade secret. The user is advised to change it from the default value after initial configuration of the system. Call the shared secret S, the [pseudo-random] 128-bit Authenticator R, and the contents of the Salt field A. Break P into 16 octet chunks p(1), p(2)...p(i), where i = len(P)/16. Call the cipher-text blocks c(1), c(2)...c(i) and the final cipher-text C. Intermediate values b(1), b(2)...c(i) are required. Encryption performed in the following manner ('+' indicates concatenation): b(1) = MD5(S + R + A) c(1) = p(1) xor b(1) C = c(1) b(2) = MD5(S + c(1)) c(2) = p(2) xor b(2) C = C + c(2) . . . . . . b(i) = MD5(S + c(i-1)) c(i) = p(i) xor b(i) C = C + c(i) The resulting encrypted String field will contain c(1)+c(2)+...+c(i). SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING

The UDP port number (0-65535) the client is using to send requests to this server. This parameter value is maintained across system reboots. This object's true data type is 1, Integer32.

RadiusEncryptedStringBefore encryption, the 'native' objects must be encoded into a formatted Octet String. After decryption, the Octet String must be decoded to obtain the 'native' objects. Fields which contain integers must be in network byte order prior to encryption of the formatted octet string. The network byte order for the Internet protocol suite is big endian. The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) functions htons and htonl will convert two and four byte integers, respectively, from host to network byte order. Likewise, the BSD functions ntohs and ntohl will convert integers from network byte order to host byte order. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Salt | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | String ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type The data type of the non-encrypted 'native' data: 1 = Integer32 2 = OCTET STRING Length The length in octets of the native object sub-field of the Octet String, exclusive of any optional padding. Note that the Integrity Check sub-fields (CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address) are not included in this length value, but since the IC sub-fields are always present and are of fixed length, there is no impediment to proper packet parsing. Salt The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each object. The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field MUST be set (1). The contents of each Salt field in a given SNMP packet must be unique. This two-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). String 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CRC (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OID-tail (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Time Stamp (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source IPv4 address (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Object/Padding ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The plain-text String field consists of six logical sub-fields: the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields (all of which are required), and the optional Padding sub-field. The String field MUST be treated as a counted-string of undistinguished octets, and not as a standard C/UNIX-style null-terminated, printable ASCII string. CRC Sub-field The CRC sub-field contains a 32-bit CRC (CRC-32) calculated over the following concatenated sub-fields of the String: the OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and unpadded native Object fields. The CRC sub-field acts as an integrity check on the decrypted data. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). OID-tail Sub-field The OID-tail sub-field contains the least significant four octets of the Object ID of the varbind. This field is included as an integrity check on the OID of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Time Stamp Sub-field The Time Stamp sub-field contains a 32-bit unsigned integer value representing the time the encrypted message was assembled. This field acts as an integrity check by facilitating the disposal of stale or replayed messages. The time window of acceptance is implementation dependent, and may be the subject of local (i.e. managed entity) policy configuration. The Time Stamp is relative time, in units of seconds, referenced to the sysUpTime object of the managed entity. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Source IPv4 address Sub-field The Source IPv4 address sub-field contains an unsigned 32-bit representation of the IPv4 address of the source of the encrypted message. This is an added check to allow verification of the source of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). The CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, and Source IPv4 address sub-fields are collectively hereinafter referred to as the Integrity Check (IC) sub-fields. Object/Padding Sub-field Object The Object sub-field contains the actual or native object data followed by padding, if necessary. If the 'native' data type is Integer32, this field must be in network byte order (big endian). Padding If the combined length (in octets) of the non-encrypted CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address, and native Object sub-fields is not an even multiple of 16, then the Padding sub-field MUST be present. If it is present, the length of the Padding sub-field is variable, between 1 and 15 octets. The value of the pad octets MUST be zero. Encrypting/Decrypting the String Field The entire String field MUST be encrypted as follows, prior to transmission: Construct a plain-text version of the String field by concatenating the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields. If necessary, pad the resulting string until its length (in octets) is an even multiple of 16. It is required that zero octets (0x00) be used for padding. Call this plain-text P. Shared Secret The shared secret is formed from the MAC (hardware) address of the primary management interface of the managed device (containing the RADIUS Client). The MAC address is represented as upper-cased, dashed-ASCII string, e.g. 08-00-2B-11-22-33. This string is not null-terminated. Authenticator The 128-bit authenticator is a manageable object. This field is a 16 byte (not null-terminated) ascii string. The pre-defined factory default value is an Enterasys Networks trade secret. The user is advised to change it from the default value after initial configuration of the system. Call the shared secret S, the [pseudo-random] 128-bit Authenticator R, and the contents of the Salt field A. Break P into 16 octet chunks p(1), p(2)...p(i), where i = len(P)/16. Call the cipher-text blocks c(1), c(2)...c(i) and the final cipher-text C. Intermediate values b(1), b(2)...c(i) are required. Encryption performed in the following manner ('+' indicates concatenation): b(1) = MD5(S + R + A) c(1) = p(1) xor b(1) C = c(1) b(2) = MD5(S + c(1)) c(2) = p(2) xor b(2) C = C + c(2) . . . . . . b(i) = MD5(S + c(i-1)) c(i) = p(i) xor b(i) C = C + c(i) The resulting encrypted String field will contain c(1)+c(2)+...+c(i). SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING

This object is the secret shared between the RADIUS authentication server and RADIUS client. This parameter value is maintained across system reboots. This object's true data type is 2, OCTET STRING.

RadiusEncryptedStringBefore encryption, the 'native' objects must be encoded into a formatted Octet String. After decryption, the Octet String must be decoded to obtain the 'native' objects. Fields which contain integers must be in network byte order prior to encryption of the formatted octet string. The network byte order for the Internet protocol suite is big endian. The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) functions htons and htonl will convert two and four byte integers, respectively, from host to network byte order. Likewise, the BSD functions ntohs and ntohl will convert integers from network byte order to host byte order. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Salt | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | String ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type The data type of the non-encrypted 'native' data: 1 = Integer32 2 = OCTET STRING Length The length in octets of the native object sub-field of the Octet String, exclusive of any optional padding. Note that the Integrity Check sub-fields (CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address) are not included in this length value, but since the IC sub-fields are always present and are of fixed length, there is no impediment to proper packet parsing. Salt The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each object. The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field MUST be set (1). The contents of each Salt field in a given SNMP packet must be unique. This two-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). String 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CRC (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OID-tail (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Time Stamp (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source IPv4 address (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Object/Padding ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The plain-text String field consists of six logical sub-fields: the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields (all of which are required), and the optional Padding sub-field. The String field MUST be treated as a counted-string of undistinguished octets, and not as a standard C/UNIX-style null-terminated, printable ASCII string. CRC Sub-field The CRC sub-field contains a 32-bit CRC (CRC-32) calculated over the following concatenated sub-fields of the String: the OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and unpadded native Object fields. The CRC sub-field acts as an integrity check on the decrypted data. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). OID-tail Sub-field The OID-tail sub-field contains the least significant four octets of the Object ID of the varbind. This field is included as an integrity check on the OID of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Time Stamp Sub-field The Time Stamp sub-field contains a 32-bit unsigned integer value representing the time the encrypted message was assembled. This field acts as an integrity check by facilitating the disposal of stale or replayed messages. The time window of acceptance is implementation dependent, and may be the subject of local (i.e. managed entity) policy configuration. The Time Stamp is relative time, in units of seconds, referenced to the sysUpTime object of the managed entity. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Source IPv4 address Sub-field The Source IPv4 address sub-field contains an unsigned 32-bit representation of the IPv4 address of the source of the encrypted message. This is an added check to allow verification of the source of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). The CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, and Source IPv4 address sub-fields are collectively hereinafter referred to as the Integrity Check (IC) sub-fields. Object/Padding Sub-field Object The Object sub-field contains the actual or native object data followed by padding, if necessary. If the 'native' data type is Integer32, this field must be in network byte order (big endian). Padding If the combined length (in octets) of the non-encrypted CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address, and native Object sub-fields is not an even multiple of 16, then the Padding sub-field MUST be present. If it is present, the length of the Padding sub-field is variable, between 1 and 15 octets. The value of the pad octets MUST be zero. Encrypting/Decrypting the String Field The entire String field MUST be encrypted as follows, prior to transmission: Construct a plain-text version of the String field by concatenating the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields. If necessary, pad the resulting string until its length (in octets) is an even multiple of 16. It is required that zero octets (0x00) be used for padding. Call this plain-text P. Shared Secret The shared secret is formed from the MAC (hardware) address of the primary management interface of the managed device (containing the RADIUS Client). The MAC address is represented as upper-cased, dashed-ASCII string, e.g. 08-00-2B-11-22-33. This string is not null-terminated. Authenticator The 128-bit authenticator is a manageable object. This field is a 16 byte (not null-terminated) ascii string. The pre-defined factory default value is an Enterasys Networks trade secret. The user is advised to change it from the default value after initial configuration of the system. Call the shared secret S, the [pseudo-random] 128-bit Authenticator R, and the contents of the Salt field A. Break P into 16 octet chunks p(1), p(2)...p(i), where i = len(P)/16. Call the cipher-text blocks c(1), c(2)...c(i) and the final cipher-text C. Intermediate values b(1), b(2)...c(i) are required. Encryption performed in the following manner ('+' indicates concatenation): b(1) = MD5(S + R + A) c(1) = p(1) xor b(1) C = c(1) b(2) = MD5(S + c(1)) c(2) = p(2) xor b(2) C = C + c(2) . . . . . . b(i) = MD5(S + c(i-1)) c(i) = p(i) xor b(i) C = C + c(i) The resulting encrypted String field will contain c(1)+c(2)+...+c(i). SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING

This object indicates the existence of a shared secret. This object's true data type is 1, Integer32.

RadiusEncryptedStringBefore encryption, the 'native' objects must be encoded into a formatted Octet String. After decryption, the Octet String must be decoded to obtain the 'native' objects. Fields which contain integers must be in network byte order prior to encryption of the formatted octet string. The network byte order for the Internet protocol suite is big endian. The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) functions htons and htonl will convert two and four byte integers, respectively, from host to network byte order. Likewise, the BSD functions ntohs and ntohl will convert integers from network byte order to host byte order. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Salt | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | String ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type The data type of the non-encrypted 'native' data: 1 = Integer32 2 = OCTET STRING Length The length in octets of the native object sub-field of the Octet String, exclusive of any optional padding. Note that the Integrity Check sub-fields (CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address) are not included in this length value, but since the IC sub-fields are always present and are of fixed length, there is no impediment to proper packet parsing. Salt The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each object. The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field MUST be set (1). The contents of each Salt field in a given SNMP packet must be unique. This two-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). String 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | CRC (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OID-tail (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Time Stamp (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source IPv4 address (4 bytes) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Object/Padding ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The plain-text String field consists of six logical sub-fields: the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields (all of which are required), and the optional Padding sub-field. The String field MUST be treated as a counted-string of undistinguished octets, and not as a standard C/UNIX-style null-terminated, printable ASCII string. CRC Sub-field The CRC sub-field contains a 32-bit CRC (CRC-32) calculated over the following concatenated sub-fields of the String: the OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and unpadded native Object fields. The CRC sub-field acts as an integrity check on the decrypted data. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). OID-tail Sub-field The OID-tail sub-field contains the least significant four octets of the Object ID of the varbind. This field is included as an integrity check on the OID of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Time Stamp Sub-field The Time Stamp sub-field contains a 32-bit unsigned integer value representing the time the encrypted message was assembled. This field acts as an integrity check by facilitating the disposal of stale or replayed messages. The time window of acceptance is implementation dependent, and may be the subject of local (i.e. managed entity) policy configuration. The Time Stamp is relative time, in units of seconds, referenced to the sysUpTime object of the managed entity. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). Source IPv4 address Sub-field The Source IPv4 address sub-field contains an unsigned 32-bit representation of the IPv4 address of the source of the encrypted message. This is an added check to allow verification of the source of the varbind. This four-byte field must be in network byte order (big endian). The CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, and Source IPv4 address sub-fields are collectively hereinafter referred to as the Integrity Check (IC) sub-fields. Object/Padding Sub-field Object The Object sub-field contains the actual or native object data followed by padding, if necessary. If the 'native' data type is Integer32, this field must be in network byte order (big endian). Padding If the combined length (in octets) of the non-encrypted CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address, and native Object sub-fields is not an even multiple of 16, then the Padding sub-field MUST be present. If it is present, the length of the Padding sub-field is variable, between 1 and 15 octets. The value of the pad octets MUST be zero. Encrypting/Decrypting the String Field The entire String field MUST be encrypted as follows, prior to transmission: Construct a plain-text version of the String field by concatenating the CRC, OID-tail, Time Stamp, Source IPv4 address and native Object sub-fields. If necessary, pad the resulting string until its length (in octets) is an even multiple of 16. It is required that zero octets (0x00) be used for padding. Call this plain-text P. Shared Secret The shared secret is formed from the MAC (hardware) address of the primary management interface of the managed device (containing the RADIUS Client). The MAC address is represented as upper-cased, dashed-ASCII string, e.g. 08-00-2B-11-22-33. This string is not null-terminated. Authenticator The 128-bit authenticator is a manageable object. This field is a 16 byte (not null-terminated) ascii string. The pre-defined factory default value is an Enterasys Networks trade secret. The user is advised to change it from the default value after initial configuration of the system. Call the shared secret S, the [pseudo-random] 128-bit Authenticator R, and the contents of the Salt field A. Break P into 16 octet chunks p(1), p(2)...p(i), where i = len(P)/16. Call the cipher-text blocks c(1), c(2)...c(i) and the final cipher-text C. Intermediate values b(1), b(2)...c(i) are required. Encryption performed in the following manner ('+' indicates concatenation): b(1) = MD5(S + R + A) c(1) = p(1) xor b(1) C = c(1) b(2) = MD5(S + c(1)) c(2) = p(2) xor b(2) C = C + c(2) . . . . . . b(i) = MD5(S + c(i-1)) c(i) = p(i) xor b(i) C = C + c(i) The resulting encrypted String field will contain c(1)+c(2)+...+c(i). SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING

This value indicates the date and time since server counters were last cleared. On a write, the server counters will be cleared and the clear time will be set to the current time if the decoded object is zero. This object's true data type is 1, Integer32.

RowStatus1 = active2 = notInService3 = notReady4 = createAndGo5 = createAndWait6 = destroyThe RowStatus textual convention is used to manage the creation and deletion of conceptual rows, and is used as the value of the SYNTAX clause for the status column of a conceptual row (as described in Section 7.7.1 of [2].) The status column has six defined values: - `active', which indicates that the conceptual row is available for use by the managed device; - `notInService', which indicates that the conceptual row exists in the agent, but is unavailable for use by the managed device (see NOTE below); 'notInService' has no implication regarding the internal consistency of the row, availability of resources, or consistency with the current state of the managed device; - `notReady', which indicates that the conceptual row exists in the agent, but is missing information necessary in order to be available for use by the managed device (i.e., one or more required columns in the conceptual row have not been instanciated); - `createAndGo', which is supplied by a management station wishing to create a new instance of a conceptual row and to have its status automatically set to active, making it available for use by the managed device; - `createAndWait', which is supplied by a management station wishing to create a new instance of a conceptual row (but not make it available for use by the managed device); and, - `destroy', which is supplied by a management station wishing to delete all of the instances associated with an existing conceptual row. Whereas five of the six values (all except `notReady') may be specified in a management protocol set operation, only three values will be returned in response to a management protocol retrieval operation: `notReady', `notInService' or `active'. That is, when queried, an existing conceptual row has only three states: it is either available for use by the managed device (the status column has value `active'); it is not available for use by the managed device, though the agent has sufficient information to attempt to make it so (the status column has value `notInService'); or, it is not available for use by the managed device, and an attempt to make it so would fail because the agent has insufficient information (the state column has value `notReady'). NOTE WELL This textual convention may be used for a MIB table, irrespective of whether the values of that table's conceptual rows are able to be modified while it is active, or whether its conceptual rows must be taken out of service in order to be modified. That is, it is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to specify whether the status column must not be `active' in order for the value of some other column of the same conceptual row to be modified. If such a specification is made, affected columns may be changed by an SNMP set PDU if the RowStatus would not be equal to `active' either immediately before or after processing the PDU. In other words, if the PDU also contained a varbind that would change the RowStatus value, the column in question may be changed if the RowStatus was not equal to `active' as the PDU was received, or if the varbind sets the status to a value other than 'active'. Also note that whenever any elements of a row exist, the RowStatus column must also exist. To summarize the effect of having a conceptual row with a status column having a SYNTAX clause value of RowStatus, consider the following state diagram: STATE +--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- | A | B | C | D | |status col.|status column| |status column | is | is |status column ACTION |does not exist| notReady | notInService| is active --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError ->D|inconsist- |inconsistent-|inconsistent- column to | or | entValue| Value| Value createAndGo |inconsistent- | | | | Value| | | --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError see 1|inconsist- |inconsistent-|inconsistent- column to | or | entValue| Value| Value createAndWait |wrongValue | | | --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |inconsistent- |inconsist- |noError |noError column to | Value| entValue| | active | | | | | | or | | | | | | | |see 2 ->D|see 8 ->D| ->D --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |inconsistent- |inconsist- |noError |noError ->C column to | Value| entValue| | notInService | | | | | | or | | or | | | | | |see 3 ->C| ->C|see 6 --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError |noError |noError |noError ->A column to | | | | or destroy | ->A| ->A| ->A|see 7 --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set any other |see 4 |noError |noError |see 5 column to some| | | | value | | see 1| ->C| ->D --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- (1) goto B or C, depending on information available to the agent. (2) if other variable bindings included in the same PDU, provide values for all columns which are missing but required, and all columns have acceptable values, then return noError and goto D. (3) if other variable bindings included in the same PDU, provide legal values for all columns which are missing but required, then return noError and goto C. (4) at the discretion of the agent, the return value may be either: inconsistentName: because the agent does not choose to create such an instance when the corresponding RowStatus instance does not exist, or inconsistentValue: if the supplied value is inconsistent with the state of some other MIB object's value, or noError: because the agent chooses to create the instance. If noError is returned, then the instance of the status column must also be created, and the new state is B or C, depending on the information available to the agent. If inconsistentName or inconsistentValue is returned, the row remains in state A. (5) depending on the MIB definition for the column/table, either noError or inconsistentValue may be returned. (6) the return value can indicate one of the following errors: wrongValue: because the agent does not support notInService (e.g., an agent which does not support createAndWait), or inconsistentValue: because the agent is unable to take the row out of service at this time, perhaps because it is in use and cannot be de-activated. (7) the return value can indicate the following error: inconsistentValue: because the agent is unable to remove the row at this time, perhaps because it is in use and cannot be de-activated. (8) the transition to D can fail, e.g., if the values of the conceptual row are inconsistent, then the error code would be inconsistentValue. NOTE: Other processing of (this and other varbinds of) the set request may result in a response other than noError being returned, e.g., wrongValue, noCreation, etc. Conceptual Row Creation There are four potential interactions when creating a conceptual row: selecting an instance-identifier which is not in use; creating the conceptual row; initializing any objects for which the agent does not supply a default; and, making the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. Interaction 1: Selecting an Instance-Identifier The algorithm used to select an instance-identifier varies for each conceptual row. In some cases, the instance- identifier is semantically significant, e.g., the destination address of a route, and a management station selects the instance-identifier according to the semantics. In other cases, the instance-identifier is used solely to distinguish conceptual rows, and a management station without specific knowledge of the conceptual row might examine the instances present in order to determine an unused instance-identifier. (This approach may be used, but it is often highly sub-optimal; however, it is also a questionable practice for a naive management station to attempt conceptual row creation.) Alternately, the MIB module which defines the conceptual row might provide one or more objects which provide assistance in determining an unused instance-identifier. For example, if the conceptual row is indexed by an integer-value, then an object having an integer-valued SYNTAX clause might be defined for such a purpose, allowing a management station to issue a management protocol retrieval operation. In order to avoid unnecessary collisions between competing management stations, `adjacent' retrievals of this object should be different. Finally, the management station could select a pseudo-random number to use as the index. In the event that this index was already in use and an inconsistentValue was returned in response to the management protocol set operation, the management station should simply select a new pseudo-random number and retry the operation. A MIB designer should choose between the two latter algorithms based on the size of the table (and therefore the efficiency of each algorithm). For tables in which a large number of entries are expected, it is recommended that a MIB object be defined that returns an acceptable index for creation. For tables with small numbers of entries, it is recommended that the latter pseudo-random index mechanism be used. Interaction 2: Creating the Conceptual Row Once an unused instance-identifier has been selected, the management station determines if it wishes to create and activate the conceptual row in one transaction or in a negotiated set of interactions. Interaction 2a: Creating and Activating the Conceptual Row The management station must first determine the column requirements, i.e., it must determine those columns for which it must or must not provide values. Depending on the complexity of the table and the management station's knowledge of the agent's capabilities, this determination can be made locally by the management station. Alternately, the management station issues a management protocol get operation to examine all columns in the conceptual row that it wishes to create. In response, for each column, there are three possible outcomes: - a value is returned, indicating that some other management station has already created this conceptual row. We return to interaction 1. - the exception `noSuchInstance' is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column, and that this column in at least one conceptual row would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval were it to exist. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access, the `noSuchInstance' exception tells the management station that it should supply a value for this column when the conceptual row is to be created. - the exception `noSuchObject' is returned, indicating that the agent does not implement the object-type associated with this column or that there is no conceptual row for which this column would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval. As such, the management station can not issue any management protocol set operations to create an instance of this column. Once the column requirements have been determined, a management protocol set operation is accordingly issued. This operation also sets the new instance of the status column to `createAndGo'. When the agent processes the set operation, it verifies that it has sufficient information to make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. The information available to the agent is provided by two sources: the management protocol set operation which creates the conceptual row, and, implementation-specific defaults supplied by the agent (note that an agent must provide implementation-specific defaults for at least those objects which it implements as read-only). If there is sufficient information available, then the conceptual row is created, a `noError' response is returned, the status column is set to `active', and no further interactions are necessary (i.e., interactions 3 and 4 are skipped). If there is insufficient information, then the conceptual row is not created, and the set operation fails with an error of `inconsistentValue'. On this error, the management station can issue a management protocol retrieval operation to determine if this was because it failed to specify a value for a required column, or, because the selected instance of the status column already existed. In the latter case, we return to interaction 1. In the former case, the management station can re-issue the set operation with the additional information, or begin interaction 2 again using `createAndWait' in order to negotiate creation of the conceptual row. NOTE WELL Regardless of the method used to determine the column requirements, it is possible that the management station might deem a column necessary when, in fact, the agent will not allow that particular columnar instance to be created or written. In this case, the management protocol set operation will fail with an error such as `noCreation' or `notWritable'. In this case, the management station decides whether it needs to be able to set a value for that particular columnar instance. If not, the management station re-issues the management protocol set operation, but without setting a value for that particular columnar instance; otherwise, the management station aborts the row creation algorithm. Interaction 2b: Negotiating the Creation of the Conceptual Row The management station issues a management protocol set operation which sets the desired instance of the status column to `createAndWait'. If the agent is unwilling to process a request of this sort, the set operation fails with an error of `wrongValue'. (As a consequence, such an agent must be prepared to accept a single management protocol set operation, i.e., interaction 2a above, containing all of the columns indicated by its column requirements.) Otherwise, the conceptual row is created, a `noError' response is returned, and the status column is immediately set to either `notInService' or `notReady', depending on whether it has sufficient information to (attempt to) make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. If there is sufficient information available, then the status column is set to `notInService'; otherwise, if there is insufficient information, then the status column is set to `notReady'. Regardless, we proceed to interaction 3. Interaction 3: Initializing non-defaulted Objects The management station must now determine the column requirements. It issues a management protocol get operation to examine all columns in the created conceptual row. In the response, for each column, there are three possible outcomes: - a value is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column and had sufficient information to provide a value. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access (and for which the agent allows their values to be changed after their creation), a value return tells the management station that it may issue additional management protocol set operations, if it desires, in order to change the value associated with this column. - the exception `noSuchInstance' is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column, and that this column in at least one conceptual row would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval were it to exist. However, the agent does not have sufficient information to provide a value, and until a value is provided, the conceptual row may not be made available for use by the managed device. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access, the `noSuchInstance' exception tells the management station that it must issue additional management protocol set operations, in order to provide a value associated with this column. - the exception `noSuchObject' is returned, indicating that the agent does not implement the object-type associated with this column or that there is no conceptual row for which this column would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval. As such, the management station can not issue any management protocol set operations to create an instance of this column. If the value associated with the status column is `notReady', then the management station must first deal with all `noSuchInstance' columns, if any. Having done so, the value of the status column becomes `notInService', and we proceed to interaction 4. Interaction 4: Making the Conceptual Row Available Once the management station is satisfied with the values associated with the columns of the conceptual row, it issues a management protocol set operation to set the status column to `active'. If the agent has sufficient information to make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device, the management protocol set operation succeeds (a `noError' response is returned). Otherwise, the management protocol set operation fails with an error of `inconsistentValue'. NOTE WELL A conceptual row having a status column with value `notInService' or `notReady' is unavailable to the managed device. As such, it is possible for the managed device to create its own instances during the time between the management protocol set operation which sets the status column to `createAndWait' and the management protocol set operation which sets the status column to `active'. In this case, when the management protocol set operation is issued to set the status column to `active', the values held in the agent supersede those used by the managed device. If the management station is prevented from setting the status column to `active' (e.g., due to management station or network failure) the conceptual row will be left in the `notInService' or `notReady' state, consuming resources indefinitely. The agent must detect conceptual rows that have been in either state for an abnormally long period of time and remove them. It is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to indicate what an abnormally long period of time would be. This period of time should be long enough to allow for human response time (including `think time') between the creation of the conceptual row and the setting of the status to `active'. In the absence of such information in the DESCRIPTION clause, it is suggested that this period be approximately 5 minutes in length. This removal action applies not only to newly-created rows, but also to previously active rows which are set to, and left in, the notInService state for a prolonged period exceeding that which is considered normal for such a conceptual row. Conceptual Row Suspension When a conceptual row is `active', the management station may issue a management protocol set operation which sets the instance of the status column to `notInService'. If the agent is unwilling to do so, the set operation fails with an error of `wrongValue' or `inconsistentValue'. Otherwise, the conceptual row is taken out of service, and a `noError' response is returned. It is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to indicate under what circumstances the status column should be taken out of service (e.g., in order for the value of some other column of the same conceptual row to be modified). Conceptual Row Deletion For deletion of conceptual rows, a management protocol set operation is issued which sets the instance of the status column to `destroy'. This request may be made regardless of the current value of the status column (e.g., it is possible to delete conceptual rows which are either `notReady', `notInService' or `active'.) If the operation succeeds, then all instances associated with the conceptual row are immediately removed. · Integer32

Lets users create and delete RADIUS authentication server entries on systems that support this capability. Rules 1. When creating a RADIUS Authentication Client, it is up to the management station to determine a suitable etsysRadiusAuthServerIndexEncrypt. To facilitate interoperability, agents should not put any restrictions on the etsysRadiusAuthServerIndexEncrypt beyond the obvious ones that it be valid and unused. 2. Before a new row can become 'active', values must be supplied for the columnar objects etsysRadiusAuthClientServerAddressEncrypt, etsysRadiusAuthClientServerPortNumberEncrypt and etsysRadiusAuthClientServerSecretEncrypt. 3. The value of etsysRadiusAuthClientServerStatusEncrypt must be set to 'notInService' in order to modify a writable object in the same conceptual row. 4. etsysRadiusAuthClientServer entries whose status is 'notReady' or 'notInService' will not be used for authentication.