SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB

SnmpEngineIDAn SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier. Objects of this type are for identification, not for addressing, even though it is possible that an address may have been used in the generation of a specific value. The value for this object may not be all zeros or all 'ff'H or the empty (zero length) string. The initial value for this object may be configured via an operator console entry or via an algorithmic function. In the latter case, the following example algorithm is recommended. In cases where there are multiple engines on the same system, the use of this algorithm is NOT appropriate, as it would result in all of those engines ending up with the same ID value. 1) The very first bit is used to indicate how the rest of the data is composed. 0 - as defined by enterprise using former methods that existed before SNMPv3. See item 2 below. 1 - as defined by this architecture, see item 3 below. Note that this allows existing uses of the engineID (also known as AgentID [RFC1910]) to co-exist with any new uses. 2) The snmpEngineID has a length of 12 octets. The first four octets are set to the binary equivalent of the agent's SNMP management private enterprise number as assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). For example, if Acme Networks has been assigned { enterprises 696 }, the first four octets would be assigned '000002b8'H. The remaining eight octets are determined via one or more enterprise-specific methods. Such methods must be designed so as to maximize the possibility that the value of this object will be unique in the agent's administrative domain. For example, it may be the IP address of the SNMP entity, or the MAC address of one of the interfaces, with each address suitably padded with random octets. If multiple methods are defined, then it is recommended that the first octet indicate the method being used and the remaining octets be a function of the method. 3) The length of the octet string varies. The first four octets are set to the binary equivalent of the agent's SNMP management private enterprise number as assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). For example, if Acme Networks has been assigned { enterprises 696 }, the first four octets would be assigned '000002b8'H. The very first bit is set to 1. For example, the above value for Acme Networks now changes to be '800002b8'H. The fifth octet indicates how the rest (6th and following octets) are formatted. The values for the fifth octet are: 0 - reserved, unused. 1 - IPv4 address (4 octets) lowest non-special IP address 2 - IPv6 address (16 octets) lowest non-special IP address 3 - MAC address (6 octets) lowest IEEE MAC address, canonical order 4 - Text, administratively assigned Maximum remaining length 27 5 - Octets, administratively assigned Maximum remaining length 27 6-127 - reserved, unused 128-255 - as defined by the enterprise Maximum remaining length 27 SIZE (5..32) · OCTET STRING

An SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier. In a simple agent, this value is always that agent's own snmpEngineID value. The value can also take the value of the snmpEngineID of a remote SNMP engine with which this user can communicate.

SnmpAdminStringAn octet string containing administrative information, preferably in human-readable form. To facilitate internationalization, this information is represented using the ISO/IEC IS 10646-1 character set, encoded as an octet string using the UTF-8 transformation format described in [RFC2279]. Since additional code points are added by amendments to the 10646 standard from time to time, implementations must be prepared to encounter any code point from 0x00000000 to 0x7fffffff. Byte sequences that do not correspond to the valid UTF-8 encoding of a code point or are outside this range are prohibited. The use of control codes should be avoided. When it is necessary to represent a newline, the control code sequence CR LF should be used. The use of leading or trailing white space should be avoided. For code points not directly supported by user interface hardware or software, an alternative means of entry and display, such as hexadecimal, may be provided. For information encoded in 7-bit US-ASCII, the UTF-8 encoding is identical to the US-ASCII encoding. UTF-8 may require multiple bytes to represent a single character / code point; thus the length of this object in octets may be different from the number of characters encoded. Similarly, size constraints refer to the number of encoded octets, not the number of characters represented by an encoding. Note that when this TC is used for an object that is used or envisioned to be used as an index, then a SIZE restriction MUST be specified so that the number of sub-identifiers for any object instance does not exceed the limit of 128, as defined by [RFC3416]. Note that the size of an SnmpAdminString object is measured in octets, not characters. SIZE (1..32) · OCTET STRING · hint 255t

A human readable string representing the name of the user. This is the (User-based Security) Model dependent security ID.

SnmpAdminStringAn octet string containing administrative information, preferably in human-readable form. To facilitate internationalization, this information is represented using the ISO/IEC IS 10646-1 character set, encoded as an octet string using the UTF-8 transformation format described in [RFC2279]. Since additional code points are added by amendments to the 10646 standard from time to time, implementations must be prepared to encounter any code point from 0x00000000 to 0x7fffffff. Byte sequences that do not correspond to the valid UTF-8 encoding of a code point or are outside this range are prohibited. The use of control codes should be avoided. When it is necessary to represent a newline, the control code sequence CR LF should be used. The use of leading or trailing white space should be avoided. For code points not directly supported by user interface hardware or software, an alternative means of entry and display, such as hexadecimal, may be provided. For information encoded in 7-bit US-ASCII, the UTF-8 encoding is identical to the US-ASCII encoding. UTF-8 may require multiple bytes to represent a single character / code point; thus the length of this object in octets may be different from the number of characters encoded. Similarly, size constraints refer to the number of encoded octets, not the number of characters represented by an encoding. Note that when this TC is used for an object that is used or envisioned to be used as an index, then a SIZE restriction MUST be specified so that the number of sub-identifiers for any object instance does not exceed the limit of 128, as defined by [RFC3416]. Note that the size of an SnmpAdminString object is measured in octets, not characters. SIZE (0..255) · OCTET STRING · hint 255t

A human readable string representing the user in Security Model independent format. The default transformation of the User-based Security Model dependent security ID to the securityName and vice versa is the identity function so that the securityName is the same as the userName.

RowPointerRepresents a pointer to a conceptual row. The value is the name of the instance of the first accessible columnar object in the conceptual row. For example, ifIndex.3 would point to the 3rd row in the ifTable (note that if ifIndex were not-accessible, then ifDescr.3 would be used instead). · OBJECT IDENTIFIER

A pointer to another conceptual row in this usmUserTable. The user in this other conceptual row is called the clone-from user. When a new user is created (i.e., a new conceptual row is instantiated in this table), the privacy and authentication parameters of the new user must be cloned from its clone-from user. These parameters are: - authentication protocol (usmUserAuthProtocol) - privacy protocol (usmUserPrivProtocol) They will be copied regardless of what the current value is. Cloning also causes the initial values of the secret authentication key (authKey) and the secret encryption key (privKey) of the new user to be set to the same values as the corresponding secrets of the clone-from user to allow the KeyChange process to occur as required during user creation. The first time an instance of this object is set by a management operation (either at or after its instantiation), the cloning process is invoked. Subsequent writes are successful but invoke no action to be taken by the receiver. The cloning process fails with an 'inconsistentName' error if the conceptual row representing the clone-from user does not exist or is not in an active state when the cloning process is invoked. When this object is read, the ZeroDotZero OID is returned.

AutonomousTypeRepresents an independently extensible type identification value. It may, for example, indicate a particular sub-tree with further MIB definitions, or define a particular type of protocol or hardware. · OBJECT IDENTIFIER

An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by usmUserEngineID, can be authenticated, and if so, the type of authentication protocol which is used. An instance of this object is created concurrently with the creation of any other object instance for the same user (i.e., as part of the processing of the set operation which creates the first object instance in the same conceptual row). If an initial set operation (i.e. at row creation time) tries to set a value for an unknown or unsupported protocol, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned. The value will be overwritten/set when a set operation is performed on the corresponding instance of usmUserCloneFrom. Once instantiated, the value of such an instance of this object can only be changed via a set operation to the value of the usmNoAuthProtocol. If a set operation tries to change the value of an existing instance of this object to any value other than usmNoAuthProtocol, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned. If a set operation tries to set the value to the usmNoAuthProtocol while the usmUserPrivProtocol value in the same row is not equal to usmNoPrivProtocol, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned. That means that an SNMP command generator application must first ensure that the usmUserPrivProtocol is set to the usmNoPrivProtocol value before it can set the usmUserAuthProtocol value to usmNoAuthProtocol.

KeyChangeEvery definition of an object with this syntax must identify a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H that produces output of L octets. The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret key K, to be modified via a one-way function. The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation of two components: first a 'random' component and then a 'delta' component. The lengths of the random and delta components are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P; if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the random and delta components is that fixed length; if P allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular maximum length, the length of the random component is that maximum length and the length of the delta component is any length less than or equal to that maximum length. For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets. usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define other sizes, as deemed appropriate. When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is obtained from either a true random generator, or from a pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the (final portion of the) 'delta' component. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object. At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the delta component is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the delta component to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value of K. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the delta component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the delta component, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to produce the (final portion of the) new value of K. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero length string. Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys. Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old key until it has confirmed that the key change actually succeeded. · OCTET STRING

An object, which when modified, causes the secret authentication key used for messages sent on behalf of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way function. The associated protocol is the usmUserAuthProtocol. The associated secret key is the user's secret authentication key (authKey). The associated hash algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's usmUserAuthProtocol. When creating a new user, it is an 'inconsistentName' error for a set operation to refer to this object unless it is previously or concurrently initialized through a set operation on the corresponding instance of usmUserCloneFrom. When the value of the corresponding usmUserAuthProtocol is usmNoAuthProtocol, then a set is successful, but effectively is a no-op. When this object is read, the zero-length (empty) string is returned. The recommended way to do a key change is as follows: 1) GET(usmUserSpinLock.0) and save in sValue. 2) generate the keyChange value based on the old (existing) secret key and the new secret key, let us call this kcValue. If you do the key change on behalf of another user: 3) SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue, usmUserAuthKeyChange=kcValue usmUserPublic=randomValue) If you do the key change for yourself: 4) SET(usmUserSpinLock.0=sValue, usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange=kcValue usmUserPublic=randomValue) If you get a response with error-status of noError, then the SET succeeded and the new key is active. If you do not get a response, then you can issue a GET(usmUserPublic) and check if the value is equal to the randomValue you did send in the SET. If so, then the key change succeeded and the new key is active (probably the response got lost). If not, then the SET request probably never reached the target and so you can start over with the procedure above.

KeyChangeEvery definition of an object with this syntax must identify a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H that produces output of L octets. The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret key K, to be modified via a one-way function. The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation of two components: first a 'random' component and then a 'delta' component. The lengths of the random and delta components are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P; if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the random and delta components is that fixed length; if P allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular maximum length, the length of the random component is that maximum length and the length of the delta component is any length less than or equal to that maximum length. For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets. usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define other sizes, as deemed appropriate. When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is obtained from either a true random generator, or from a pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the (final portion of the) 'delta' component. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object. At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the delta component is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the delta component to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value of K. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the delta component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the delta component, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to produce the (final portion of the) new value of K. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero length string. Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys. Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old key until it has confirmed that the key change actually succeeded. · OCTET STRING

Behaves exactly as usmUserAuthKeyChange, with one notable difference: in order for the set operation to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation requester must match the usmUserName that indexes the row which is targeted by this operation. In addition, the USM security model must be used for this operation. The idea here is that access to this column can be public, since it will only allow a user to change his own secret authentication key (authKey). Note that this can only be done once the row is active. When a set is received and the usmUserName of the requester is not the same as the umsUserName that indexes the row which is targeted by this operation, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned. When a set is received and the security model in use is not USM, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned.

AutonomousTypeRepresents an independently extensible type identification value. It may, for example, indicate a particular sub-tree with further MIB definitions, or define a particular type of protocol or hardware. · OBJECT IDENTIFIER

An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by usmUserEngineID, can be protected from disclosure, and if so, the type of privacy protocol which is used. An instance of this object is created concurrently with the creation of any other object instance for the same user (i.e., as part of the processing of the set operation which creates the first object instance in the same conceptual row). If an initial set operation (i.e. at row creation time) tries to set a value for an unknown or unsupported protocol, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned. The value will be overwritten/set when a set operation is performed on the corresponding instance of usmUserCloneFrom. Once instantiated, the value of such an instance of this object can only be changed via a set operation to the value of the usmNoPrivProtocol. If a set operation tries to change the value of an existing instance of this object to any value other than usmNoPrivProtocol, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned. Note that if any privacy protocol is used, then you must also use an authentication protocol. In other words, if usmUserPrivProtocol is set to anything else than usmNoPrivProtocol, then the corresponding instance of usmUserAuthProtocol cannot have a value of usmNoAuthProtocol. If it does, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned.

KeyChangeEvery definition of an object with this syntax must identify a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H that produces output of L octets. The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret key K, to be modified via a one-way function. The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation of two components: first a 'random' component and then a 'delta' component. The lengths of the random and delta components are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P; if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the random and delta components is that fixed length; if P allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular maximum length, the length of the random component is that maximum length and the length of the delta component is any length less than or equal to that maximum length. For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets. usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define other sizes, as deemed appropriate. When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is obtained from either a true random generator, or from a pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the (final portion of the) 'delta' component. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object. At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the delta component is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the delta component to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value of K. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the delta component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the delta component, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to produce the (final portion of the) new value of K. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero length string. Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys. Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old key until it has confirmed that the key change actually succeeded. · OCTET STRING

An object, which when modified, causes the secret encryption key used for messages sent on behalf of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way function. The associated protocol is the usmUserPrivProtocol. The associated secret key is the user's secret privacy key (privKey). The associated hash algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's usmUserAuthProtocol. When creating a new user, it is an 'inconsistentName' error for a set operation to refer to this object unless it is previously or concurrently initialized through a set operation on the corresponding instance of usmUserCloneFrom. When the value of the corresponding usmUserPrivProtocol is usmNoPrivProtocol, then a set is successful, but effectively is a no-op. When this object is read, the zero-length (empty) string is returned. See the description clause of usmUserAuthKeyChange for a recommended procedure to do a key change.

KeyChangeEvery definition of an object with this syntax must identify a protocol P, a secret key K, and a hash algorithm H that produces output of L octets. The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret key K, to be modified via a one-way function. The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation of two components: first a 'random' component and then a 'delta' component. The lengths of the random and delta components are given by the corresponding value of the protocol P; if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the random and delta components is that fixed length; if P allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular maximum length, the length of the random component is that maximum length and the length of the delta component is any length less than or equal to that maximum length. For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets. usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of 20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define other sizes, as deemed appropriate. When a requester wants to change the old key K to a new key keyNew on a remote entity, the 'random' component is obtained from either a true random generator, or from a pseudorandom generator, and the 'delta' component is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the keyNew is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the keyNew to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the 'delta' component. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the keyNew component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the keyNew, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the keyNew to produce the (final portion of the) 'delta' component. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The 'random' and 'delta' components are then concatenated as described above, and the resulting octet string is sent to the recipient as the new value of an instance of this object. At the receiver side, when an instance of this object is set to a new value, then a new value of K is computed as follows: - a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value of K; - if the length of the delta component is greater than L octets, then: - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and the temporary variable is set to this digest value; - the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the delta component to produce the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value of K. - the above two steps are repeated until the unused portion of the delta component is L octets or less, - the random component is appended to the value of the temporary variable, and the result is input to the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value; - this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same length as the unused portion of the delta component, is XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to produce the (final portion of the) new value of K. For example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H: iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */ temp = keyOld; for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15]; } temp = MD5 (temp || random); keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] = temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1]; The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero length string. Note that the keyOld and keyNew are the localized keys. Note that it is probably wise that when an SNMP entity sends a SetRequest to change a key, that it keeps a copy of the old key until it has confirmed that the key change actually succeeded. · OCTET STRING

Behaves exactly as usmUserPrivKeyChange, with one notable difference: in order for the Set operation to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation requester must match the usmUserName that indexes the row which is targeted by this operation. In addition, the USM security model must be used for this operation. The idea here is that access to this column can be public, since it will only allow a user to change his own secret privacy key (privKey). Note that this can only be done once the row is active. When a set is received and the usmUserName of the requester is not the same as the umsUserName that indexes the row which is targeted by this operation, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned. When a set is received and the security model in use is not USM, then a 'noAccess' error must be returned.

OCTET STRING SIZE (0..32)

A publicly-readable value which can be written as part of the procedure for changing a user's secret authentication and/or privacy key, and later read to determine whether the change of the secret was effected.

StorageType1 = other2 = volatile3 = nonVolatile4 = permanent5 = readOnlyDescribes the memory realization of a conceptual row. A row which is volatile(2) is lost upon reboot. A row which is either nonVolatile(3), permanent(4) or readOnly(5), is backed up by stable storage. A row which is permanent(4) can be changed but not deleted. A row which is readOnly(5) cannot be changed nor deleted. If the value of an object with this syntax is either permanent(4) or readOnly(5), it cannot be written. Conversely, if the value is either other(1), volatile(2) or nonVolatile(3), it cannot be modified to be permanent(4) or readOnly(5). (All illegal modifications result in a 'wrongValue' error.) Every usage of this textual convention is required to specify the columnar objects which a permanent(4) row must at a minimum allow to be writable. · Integer32

The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows having the value 'permanent' must allow write-access at a minimum to: - usmUserAuthKeyChange, usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange and usmUserPublic for a user who employs authentication, and - usmUserPrivKeyChange, usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange and usmUserPublic for a user who employs privacy. Note that any user who employs authentication or privacy must allow its secret(s) to be updated and thus cannot be 'readOnly'. If an initial set operation tries to set the value to 'readOnly' for a user who employs authentication or privacy, then an 'inconsistentValue' error must be returned. Note that if the value has been previously set (implicit or explicit) to any value, then the rules as defined in the StorageType Textual Convention apply. It is an implementation issue to decide if a SET for a readOnly or permanent row is accepted at all. In some contexts this may make sense, in others it may not. If a SET for a readOnly or permanent row is not accepted at all, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned.

RowStatus1 = active2 = notInService3 = notReady4 = createAndGo5 = createAndWait6 = destroyThe RowStatus textual convention is used to manage the creation and deletion of conceptual rows, and is used as the value of the SYNTAX clause for the status column of a conceptual row (as described in Section 7.7.1 of [2].) The status column has six defined values: - `active', which indicates that the conceptual row is available for use by the managed device; - `notInService', which indicates that the conceptual row exists in the agent, but is unavailable for use by the managed device (see NOTE below); 'notInService' has no implication regarding the internal consistency of the row, availability of resources, or consistency with the current state of the managed device; - `notReady', which indicates that the conceptual row exists in the agent, but is missing information necessary in order to be available for use by the managed device (i.e., one or more required columns in the conceptual row have not been instanciated); - `createAndGo', which is supplied by a management station wishing to create a new instance of a conceptual row and to have its status automatically set to active, making it available for use by the managed device; - `createAndWait', which is supplied by a management station wishing to create a new instance of a conceptual row (but not make it available for use by the managed device); and, - `destroy', which is supplied by a management station wishing to delete all of the instances associated with an existing conceptual row. Whereas five of the six values (all except `notReady') may be specified in a management protocol set operation, only three values will be returned in response to a management protocol retrieval operation: `notReady', `notInService' or `active'. That is, when queried, an existing conceptual row has only three states: it is either available for use by the managed device (the status column has value `active'); it is not available for use by the managed device, though the agent has sufficient information to attempt to make it so (the status column has value `notInService'); or, it is not available for use by the managed device, and an attempt to make it so would fail because the agent has insufficient information (the state column has value `notReady'). NOTE WELL This textual convention may be used for a MIB table, irrespective of whether the values of that table's conceptual rows are able to be modified while it is active, or whether its conceptual rows must be taken out of service in order to be modified. That is, it is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to specify whether the status column must not be `active' in order for the value of some other column of the same conceptual row to be modified. If such a specification is made, affected columns may be changed by an SNMP set PDU if the RowStatus would not be equal to `active' either immediately before or after processing the PDU. In other words, if the PDU also contained a varbind that would change the RowStatus value, the column in question may be changed if the RowStatus was not equal to `active' as the PDU was received, or if the varbind sets the status to a value other than 'active'. Also note that whenever any elements of a row exist, the RowStatus column must also exist. To summarize the effect of having a conceptual row with a status column having a SYNTAX clause value of RowStatus, consider the following state diagram: STATE +--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- | A | B | C | D | |status col.|status column| |status column | is | is |status column ACTION |does not exist| notReady | notInService| is active --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError ->D|inconsist- |inconsistent-|inconsistent- column to | or | entValue| Value| Value createAndGo |inconsistent- | | | | Value| | | --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError see 1|inconsist- |inconsistent-|inconsistent- column to | or | entValue| Value| Value createAndWait |wrongValue | | | --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |inconsistent- |inconsist- |noError |noError column to | Value| entValue| | active | | | | | | or | | | | | | | |see 2 ->D|see 8 ->D| ->D --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |inconsistent- |inconsist- |noError |noError ->C column to | Value| entValue| | notInService | | | | | | or | | or | | | | | |see 3 ->C| ->C|see 6 --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set status |noError |noError |noError |noError ->A column to | | | | or destroy | ->A| ->A| ->A|see 7 --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- set any other |see 4 |noError |noError |see 5 column to some| | | | value | | see 1| ->C| ->D --------------+--------------+-----------+-------------+------------- (1) goto B or C, depending on information available to the agent. (2) if other variable bindings included in the same PDU, provide values for all columns which are missing but required, and all columns have acceptable values, then return noError and goto D. (3) if other variable bindings included in the same PDU, provide legal values for all columns which are missing but required, then return noError and goto C. (4) at the discretion of the agent, the return value may be either: inconsistentName: because the agent does not choose to create such an instance when the corresponding RowStatus instance does not exist, or inconsistentValue: if the supplied value is inconsistent with the state of some other MIB object's value, or noError: because the agent chooses to create the instance. If noError is returned, then the instance of the status column must also be created, and the new state is B or C, depending on the information available to the agent. If inconsistentName or inconsistentValue is returned, the row remains in state A. (5) depending on the MIB definition for the column/table, either noError or inconsistentValue may be returned. (6) the return value can indicate one of the following errors: wrongValue: because the agent does not support notInService (e.g., an agent which does not support createAndWait), or inconsistentValue: because the agent is unable to take the row out of service at this time, perhaps because it is in use and cannot be de-activated. (7) the return value can indicate the following error: inconsistentValue: because the agent is unable to remove the row at this time, perhaps because it is in use and cannot be de-activated. (8) the transition to D can fail, e.g., if the values of the conceptual row are inconsistent, then the error code would be inconsistentValue. NOTE: Other processing of (this and other varbinds of) the set request may result in a response other than noError being returned, e.g., wrongValue, noCreation, etc. Conceptual Row Creation There are four potential interactions when creating a conceptual row: selecting an instance-identifier which is not in use; creating the conceptual row; initializing any objects for which the agent does not supply a default; and, making the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. Interaction 1: Selecting an Instance-Identifier The algorithm used to select an instance-identifier varies for each conceptual row. In some cases, the instance- identifier is semantically significant, e.g., the destination address of a route, and a management station selects the instance-identifier according to the semantics. In other cases, the instance-identifier is used solely to distinguish conceptual rows, and a management station without specific knowledge of the conceptual row might examine the instances present in order to determine an unused instance-identifier. (This approach may be used, but it is often highly sub-optimal; however, it is also a questionable practice for a naive management station to attempt conceptual row creation.) Alternately, the MIB module which defines the conceptual row might provide one or more objects which provide assistance in determining an unused instance-identifier. For example, if the conceptual row is indexed by an integer-value, then an object having an integer-valued SYNTAX clause might be defined for such a purpose, allowing a management station to issue a management protocol retrieval operation. In order to avoid unnecessary collisions between competing management stations, `adjacent' retrievals of this object should be different. Finally, the management station could select a pseudo-random number to use as the index. In the event that this index was already in use and an inconsistentValue was returned in response to the management protocol set operation, the management station should simply select a new pseudo-random number and retry the operation. A MIB designer should choose between the two latter algorithms based on the size of the table (and therefore the efficiency of each algorithm). For tables in which a large number of entries are expected, it is recommended that a MIB object be defined that returns an acceptable index for creation. For tables with small numbers of entries, it is recommended that the latter pseudo-random index mechanism be used. Interaction 2: Creating the Conceptual Row Once an unused instance-identifier has been selected, the management station determines if it wishes to create and activate the conceptual row in one transaction or in a negotiated set of interactions. Interaction 2a: Creating and Activating the Conceptual Row The management station must first determine the column requirements, i.e., it must determine those columns for which it must or must not provide values. Depending on the complexity of the table and the management station's knowledge of the agent's capabilities, this determination can be made locally by the management station. Alternately, the management station issues a management protocol get operation to examine all columns in the conceptual row that it wishes to create. In response, for each column, there are three possible outcomes: - a value is returned, indicating that some other management station has already created this conceptual row. We return to interaction 1. - the exception `noSuchInstance' is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column, and that this column in at least one conceptual row would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval were it to exist. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access, the `noSuchInstance' exception tells the management station that it should supply a value for this column when the conceptual row is to be created. - the exception `noSuchObject' is returned, indicating that the agent does not implement the object-type associated with this column or that there is no conceptual row for which this column would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval. As such, the management station can not issue any management protocol set operations to create an instance of this column. Once the column requirements have been determined, a management protocol set operation is accordingly issued. This operation also sets the new instance of the status column to `createAndGo'. When the agent processes the set operation, it verifies that it has sufficient information to make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. The information available to the agent is provided by two sources: the management protocol set operation which creates the conceptual row, and, implementation-specific defaults supplied by the agent (note that an agent must provide implementation-specific defaults for at least those objects which it implements as read-only). If there is sufficient information available, then the conceptual row is created, a `noError' response is returned, the status column is set to `active', and no further interactions are necessary (i.e., interactions 3 and 4 are skipped). If there is insufficient information, then the conceptual row is not created, and the set operation fails with an error of `inconsistentValue'. On this error, the management station can issue a management protocol retrieval operation to determine if this was because it failed to specify a value for a required column, or, because the selected instance of the status column already existed. In the latter case, we return to interaction 1. In the former case, the management station can re-issue the set operation with the additional information, or begin interaction 2 again using `createAndWait' in order to negotiate creation of the conceptual row. NOTE WELL Regardless of the method used to determine the column requirements, it is possible that the management station might deem a column necessary when, in fact, the agent will not allow that particular columnar instance to be created or written. In this case, the management protocol set operation will fail with an error such as `noCreation' or `notWritable'. In this case, the management station decides whether it needs to be able to set a value for that particular columnar instance. If not, the management station re-issues the management protocol set operation, but without setting a value for that particular columnar instance; otherwise, the management station aborts the row creation algorithm. Interaction 2b: Negotiating the Creation of the Conceptual Row The management station issues a management protocol set operation which sets the desired instance of the status column to `createAndWait'. If the agent is unwilling to process a request of this sort, the set operation fails with an error of `wrongValue'. (As a consequence, such an agent must be prepared to accept a single management protocol set operation, i.e., interaction 2a above, containing all of the columns indicated by its column requirements.) Otherwise, the conceptual row is created, a `noError' response is returned, and the status column is immediately set to either `notInService' or `notReady', depending on whether it has sufficient information to (attempt to) make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device. If there is sufficient information available, then the status column is set to `notInService'; otherwise, if there is insufficient information, then the status column is set to `notReady'. Regardless, we proceed to interaction 3. Interaction 3: Initializing non-defaulted Objects The management station must now determine the column requirements. It issues a management protocol get operation to examine all columns in the created conceptual row. In the response, for each column, there are three possible outcomes: - a value is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column and had sufficient information to provide a value. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access (and for which the agent allows their values to be changed after their creation), a value return tells the management station that it may issue additional management protocol set operations, if it desires, in order to change the value associated with this column. - the exception `noSuchInstance' is returned, indicating that the agent implements the object-type associated with this column, and that this column in at least one conceptual row would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval were it to exist. However, the agent does not have sufficient information to provide a value, and until a value is provided, the conceptual row may not be made available for use by the managed device. For those columns to which the agent provides read-create access, the `noSuchInstance' exception tells the management station that it must issue additional management protocol set operations, in order to provide a value associated with this column. - the exception `noSuchObject' is returned, indicating that the agent does not implement the object-type associated with this column or that there is no conceptual row for which this column would be accessible in the MIB view used by the retrieval. As such, the management station can not issue any management protocol set operations to create an instance of this column. If the value associated with the status column is `notReady', then the management station must first deal with all `noSuchInstance' columns, if any. Having done so, the value of the status column becomes `notInService', and we proceed to interaction 4. Interaction 4: Making the Conceptual Row Available Once the management station is satisfied with the values associated with the columns of the conceptual row, it issues a management protocol set operation to set the status column to `active'. If the agent has sufficient information to make the conceptual row available for use by the managed device, the management protocol set operation succeeds (a `noError' response is returned). Otherwise, the management protocol set operation fails with an error of `inconsistentValue'. NOTE WELL A conceptual row having a status column with value `notInService' or `notReady' is unavailable to the managed device. As such, it is possible for the managed device to create its own instances during the time between the management protocol set operation which sets the status column to `createAndWait' and the management protocol set operation which sets the status column to `active'. In this case, when the management protocol set operation is issued to set the status column to `active', the values held in the agent supersede those used by the managed device. If the management station is prevented from setting the status column to `active' (e.g., due to management station or network failure) the conceptual row will be left in the `notInService' or `notReady' state, consuming resources indefinitely. The agent must detect conceptual rows that have been in either state for an abnormally long period of time and remove them. It is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to indicate what an abnormally long period of time would be. This period of time should be long enough to allow for human response time (including `think time') between the creation of the conceptual row and the setting of the status to `active'. In the absence of such information in the DESCRIPTION clause, it is suggested that this period be approximately 5 minutes in length. This removal action applies not only to newly-created rows, but also to previously active rows which are set to, and left in, the notInService state for a prolonged period exceeding that which is considered normal for such a conceptual row. Conceptual Row Suspension When a conceptual row is `active', the management station may issue a management protocol set operation which sets the instance of the status column to `notInService'. If the agent is unwilling to do so, the set operation fails with an error of `wrongValue' or `inconsistentValue'. Otherwise, the conceptual row is taken out of service, and a `noError' response is returned. It is the responsibility of the DESCRIPTION clause of the status column to indicate under what circumstances the status column should be taken out of service (e.g., in order for the value of some other column of the same conceptual row to be modified). Conceptual Row Deletion For deletion of conceptual rows, a management protocol set operation is issued which sets the instance of the status column to `destroy'. This request may be made regardless of the current value of the status column (e.g., it is possible to delete conceptual rows which are either `notReady', `notInService' or `active'.) If the operation succeeds, then all instances associated with the conceptual row are immediately removed. · Integer32

The status of this conceptual row. Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the usmUserStatus column is 'notReady'. In particular, a newly created row for a user who employs authentication, cannot be made active until the corresponding usmUserCloneFrom and usmUserAuthKeyChange have been set. Further, a newly created row for a user who also employs privacy, cannot be made active until the usmUserPrivKeyChange has been set. The RowStatus TC [RFC2579] requires that this DESCRIPTION clause states under which circumstances other objects in this row can be modified: The value of this object has no effect on whether other objects in this conceptual row can be modified, except for usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange and usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange. For these 2 objects, the value of usmUserStatus MUST be active.